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Abstract – We argue that the impact of capital gains taxation on asset pricing depends on the 
tax awareness of market participants. While institutional investors should be generally well-
informed about tax regulations, private investors have only limited tax knowledge and 
resources. As a result, market reactions on tax law changes may be delayed if a considerable 
fraction of market participants is not fully tax-aware. In line with our argument, we find 
evidence that the introduction of a previously announced German flat tax on private capital 
gains in 2009 resulted in a temporarily strong and significant increase of trading volumes, 
daily returns and asset prices. Our research implies that tax law changes provide an 
opportunity for well-informed investors to generate arbitrage benefits. Corresponding to our 
estimate, the capital gains tax resulted in an increase demand for shares of 160 % as well as in 
an price surplus of about 7.4 % within the last two trading days 2008. 
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1. Introduction 
The question if and how taxes affect stock prices is a central aspect for firm valuation, tax 
planning and tax policy that has been frequently discussed (e.g. Blouin, Raedy, and 
Shackelford, 2002; Ayers, Lefanowicz, and Robinson, 2003; Dhaliwal, Li, and Trezevant, 
2003). While the literature provides evidence that anticipated capital gains taxes will be 
reflected in the asset price (e.g. Günther and Willenborg, 1999; for a review see Hanlon and 
Heitzman, 2010), corresponding studies are generally based on the theory of market 
efficiency implying an immediate response of investors to new relevant information. Thus, 
the focus of the empirical literature is on announcement effects of tax law changes (Lang and 
Shackelford, 2000; Dai, Maydew, Shackelford, and Zhang, 2008; Blouin, Hail, and Yetman, 
2009). 
However, as research on tax salience suggests, tax effects on decision-making are not only 
driven by tax burdens and tax planning opportunities, but also by tax information and tax 
awareness of individual decision-makers (Chetty, Looney and Kroft, 2009; Finkelstein, 2009; 
Edgerton, 2012; Alstadsaeter and Jacob, 2013). Corresponding results suggest that private 
investors, even if they have heard about an upcoming tax reform, may not optimally consider 
taxes by reason of tax unawareness and procrastination behavior. Regarding the capitalization 
of taxes in asset prices, these findings raise some doubt about the optimal decision-making of 
private investors and the efficiency of financial markets in processing tax-relevant 
information. 
Combining both strands of literature, we argue that the capitalization of capital gains taxes in 
asset prices does not only depend on tax rates and assessment bases, but also on the tax 
awareness of market participants and especially private investors with limited tax knowledge. 
Furthermore, as tax awareness cannot be regarded as constant over time, the capitalization of 
capital gains taxes (and likewise other forms of taxation) may not only be driven by 
announcement dates of upcoming tax reforms but also by the relevance of tax issues in the 
media affecting the degree of tax awareness in a society. Hence, it may be insufficient to 
focus exclusively on announcement dates of tax reforms to identify tax effects on asset 
pricing.  
We refer to a recent major reform of German capital gains taxes in order to address these 
issues empirically. Before the reform, capital gains on private shareholdings were generally 
tax-exempt if the holding period exceeded one year. In May and in July 2007 the German 
federal parliament and the German federal council concluded a business tax reform including 
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a capital gains tax with a flat rate of 26.38 % (25 % income tax plus solidarity tax surcharge) 
on all private shareholdings acquired after December 31, 2008. Therefore, the reform 
generated a strong incentive for private investors to buy shares before its introduction date of 
the reform on January 1, 2009. Note that the taxation of well-informed institutional investors 
was not affected by this reform. 
Assuming fully tax-aware investors and taking into account the long interval between the 
official announcement of the reform (July 2007) and its introduction (January 2009), market 
reactions should have been focused on the announcement date, while the corresponding 
introduction date should have been anticipated by the market. However, as documented by 
market research of Deutsche Bank (2008) and the largest German market research institute 
GfK (GfK, 2008; Hilmes, 2008) during the last months 2008, the majority of German private 
investors was either unaware or not fully aware about the capital gains tax reform. 
In December 2008, the subject became a major issue of public debate and was strongly 
discussed by the media. Börse Online titled on December 18, 2008, “The count down for the 
capital gains tax is running” and on December 20 the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (as the 
probably most popular general daily newspaper for brokers) titled “Final spurt for tax savers”. 
On December 22, Frank Wiebe wrote in Handelsblatt “There is a good reason to buy shares in 
the current year: the capital gains tax.” Lange and Reiche from Manager Magazine Online 
warned investors by the end of the year 2008:„There is little time to act. […] The investor 
who wants to avoid the new capital gains tax has only four trading days left.[…]”. Then, on 
December 29, the Berliner Morgenpost concluded: “Private investors buy shares in order to 
avoid capital gains tax” (all statements translated from German language). 
Therefore, we expect that private investors did not only focus on the announcement date of 
the German capital gains tax reform but also on its introduction date resulting in a strong 
impact on trading volumes and share prices by the end of 2008. There are two theoretical 
justifications for this hypothesis. First of all, the vivid public debate on the capital gains tax 
reform in December 2008 ‘alarmed’ private investors resulting in higher tax awareness. 
Second, evidence from the psychological and financial literature suggests that private 
decision-makers tend to procrastinate savings and portfolio decisions up to the final possible 
decision moment (Akerlof, 1991; Ferrari and Dovidio, 2000; Ferrari and Hammer, 2002; 
Thaler and Bernartzi, 2004). 
In our empirical analysis, we test for abnormal trading volumes, asset prices and daily returns 
of all stocks listed on the German stock market at the turn of the year 2008/2009. We do not 
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consider announcement effects of the tax reform, which are hard to isolate and have already 
been investigated by Voeller and Müller (2011).
1
 Using difference-in-differences estimation, 
we find evidence for a temporarily strong increase in trading volumes and asset prices. 
Controlling for end-of-the-year effects, the average trading volume in the last two trading 
days 2008 exceeded the regular volume by 160 %. In addition, investors paid an asset price 
surcharge of about 7.4 % in these days. On the contrary, we observe negative abnormal 
trading volumes and daily returns in the week following the turn-of-the-year 2008/2009. 
Thus, our research suggests shifting of share trades from 2009 to 2008 in order to avoid tax 
payments. 
Our findings have important implications for tax policy and research. We are the first to argue 
and to show empirically that the capitalization of taxes in stock prices and trading volumes 
can be significantly affected by tax awareness. Thus, it may be insufficient to focus 
exclusively on announcement dates of tax reforms in order to identify the effect of tax law 
changes on asset pricing. If a significant fraction of investors will not be aware about the 
announcement date of a corresponding tax reform, such estimates may understate the true tax 
effect on asset pricing. In addition, tax policy might take use of such a behavior in order to 
avoid unwanted price and trading fluctuations. 
Second, our paper highlights limitations of capital markets in processing tax-relevant 
information. As shown for the case of Germany, the announcement of a certain event may be 
ignored for a considerable time by a large fraction of market participants. Thus, unawareness 
and procrastination seem to be not only an issue for savings behavior and retirement annuities 
(Madrian and Shea, 2001; Carroll et al., 2009), but also for private shareholders. However, as 
the time to react expires, the awareness of the market increases, which may result in herd 
behavior and higher market volatility. 
Third, our analysis points to opportunities for well-informed and tax-aware investors to 
generate tax arbitrage profits. If delayed market reactions close to introduction dates of tax 
reforms might be anticipated, an optimal strategy would be to sell shares exactly before the 
introduction date and to rebuy these shares about one week thereafter. Note that our 
regressions imply an unexpected average increase in share prices of about 7.4 % in the last 
                                                          
1  Note that the capital gains tax reform 2009 was part of a broader reform package (German business tax 
reform 2008/2009). As these regulations were jointly announced and approved by the German legislator (see 
Section 2), an empirical identification of the isolated announcement of the German capital gains tax reform 
2009 should be a hard task. However, that does not hold for the introduction date, as all other relevant reform 
measures of the business tax reform 2008/2009 were already introduced by January 2008 and not in January 
2009 (like the capital gains tax reform). 
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two trading days 2008, and that institutional investors were not affected by higher capital 
gains taxation. Thus, institutional investors might have benefited significantly from the 
reform. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a brief overview of the German capital 
gains tax reform 2009 and the more comprehensive business tax reform 2008/2009. Section 3 
develops theory and derives our hypotheses. Section 4 provides the identification strategy and 
the data. Section 5 reports and discusses our results. Section 6 concludes. 
2. The German capital gains tax reform 2009 
The introduction of the new German capital gains tax 2009 was embedded in the more general 
business tax reform 2008/2009. This reform introduced major changes in the German taxation 
of companies including the reduction of the corporate income tax rate from 26.38 % to 
15.83 % (including solidarity tax surcharge), the broadening of the income tax base for 
businesses (e.g. by a revision of thin-capitalization tax rules and the abolishment of the 
deductibility of the German local business tax) and coordinated tax reforms for partnerships, 
single businesses and private persons. The main objective of the reform was to enhance 
Germany’s attractiveness for national and international business investment. Relevant for our 
investigation is the revision of the tax system for capital earnings and capital gains of private 
persons. Note that the introduction date of capital gains and earnings taxation (January 2009) 
significantly differed from the introduction date of the other reform measures (January 2008). 
Therefore, corresponding tax effects may be isolated from the other regulations of the 
business tax reform 2008/2009. 
First media reports on a major German reform of business taxation tax go back to April 10, 
2006. In June 2006, a draft paper of the German ministry of finance reported about a general 
withholding tax on private capital earnings (including interests and dividends) and private 
capital gains with a flat rate. The established task force presented the integrated concept in 
November 2006. In January 2007, the decision was made to introduce the flat tax on private 
capital earnings and private capital gains on January 1, 2009 (in derogation from the 
introduction of the other reform measures on January 1, 2008). In addition, it was decided to 
maintain the old capital gains taxation for shares acquired before that date. 
The final bill was presented in May 2007 and was approved shortly thereafter by the federal 
council and the federal parliament (May and July 2007). Figure 1 illustrates the described 
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process of the German business tax reform 2008/2009 including the capital gains tax reform 
2009 (for a more detailed review see Voeller and Müller, 2011): 
[Figure 1 about here] 
For shares bought before January 2009, the taxation of capital gains of German private 
investors depends on the holding period. If the holding period exceeds one year, investors 
may sell shares tax-free. Otherwise (holding period < one year), 50 % of the capital gains 
were taxed with the regular progressive personal income tax rate (including solidarity tax 
surcharge) ranging from 0 % to 47.48 %. Hence, the maximum effective capital gains tax rate 
on shares bought before January 2009 is 23.74 %. 
By contrast, capital gains realized from shares bought after December 2008 are taxable with 
the minimum of the regular progressive income tax rate or a flat rate of 26.38 % (including 
solidarity tax surcharge) on interests, dividends and capital gains. After 2008, there was no 
discriminative tax treatment depending on the length of the holding period. Table 1 illustrates 
the taxation before and after the capital gains tax reform 2009: 
[Table 1 about here] 
In general, investors face a considerably higher tax burden on capital gains if shares have 
been purchased after January 1, 2009.
2
 At a holding period longer than one year, the tax 
burden increases by 26.38 % for taxpayers with a personal income tax rate of at least 25 % 
(excluding solidarity tax surcharge). At a holding period smaller than one year, the additional 
tax burden increases inversely to the regular personal income tax rate. For example, at a 
personal tax rate of 26.38 %, the tax burden doubles from 13.19 % for shares purchased 
before 2009 to 26.38 % for shares purchased in 2009 and thereafter (including solidarity tax 
surcharge). 
In spite of these clear tax incentives for private shareholders, a majority of Germans lacked 
awareness about the upcoming reform during the last months of 2008. A survey of the 
Deutsche Bank (2008) suggests that 100 days before the introduction date, 66 % of German 
residents had some knowledge about the new capital gains tax, but only 11 % considered the 
tax rate change in their trading decisions. Correspondingly, Guido Servais (the German 
marketing director for JP Morgan Asset Management) stated in September 2008 that only 
                                                          
2  That holds also for taxpayers with a regular personal income tax rate below 25 %. In these cases, the regular 
income tax rate applies after the capital gains tax reform 2009. By contrast, either 0 % (holding period ≥ one 
year) or 50 % (holding period < one year) of capital gains were taxed with the regular personal income tax 
rate before the capital gains tax reform 2009.  
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10 % of private investors were planning to adjust their portfolio by reason of tax reform.
3
 
According to a survey of GfK (2008) in November 3, 2008, only 30 % of the respondents felt 
well-informed about the capital gains tax reform, while 30 % obtained limited information 
and 40 % were not informed at all. About two thirds claimed that they were planning to obtain 
better information until the end of the year 2008.  
Taking into account the limited knowledge of the German public, it should not be unexpected 
that the capital gains tax reform 2009 has been strongly discussed by the media in December 
2008 (all statements translated from German language). Die Welt titled on December 3 “Final 
spurt to the capital gains tax”, on December 7 “The last 25 days without a withholding tax on 
capital gains” and on December 9 “The stock market crisis as a benefit: Investors may use 
low share prices and save the new capital gains tax”. RP Online emphasized at December 11, 
2008 “The last chance to avoid the unpopular tax would be to buy stocks before the deadline 
on January 1, 2009.” The Berliner Morgenpost encouraged private investors on December 14 
“Attention capital gains tax! 15 Financial products for the final tax spurt 2008” and the 
Frankfurter Rundschau even warned on December 15: “The final spurt might end up in 
exaggerated share prices”.  
As mentioned previously, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on December 20 announced the 
“Final spurt for tax savers”. Handelsblatt titled on December 22 “Last call! Who wants to buy 
shares in this year must hurry up – Higher taxes on January”. Herrmann from TAZ online 
pointed out on the morning of December 29: “Exactly two days are left for investors to stock 
up on shares on the capital markets, for which a tax-free selling is possible after one year of 
holding.” Even the Tagesschau (as the most important daily news on German television) 
reported on December 30 on the capital gains tax reform 2009.
4
 As result, average awareness 
of German private investors regarding the introduction of the new capital gains tax should 
have increased significantly by the end of 2008. 
3. Theory and hypotheses 
Corresponding to Lang and Shackelford (2000), the current share price 0P  of an asset can be 
modelled as a function of constant free cash flows F , the shareholder distribution of the 
                                                          
3  http://www.dasinvestment.com/nc/berater/news/datum/2008/09/04/ex-linde-partners-strategie-steht-im-
fondsnamen/ (online access June 24, 2013). 
4  See for online access http://www.tagesschau.de/archiv/sendungsarchiv100~_date-20081230.html. 
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following period (with a constant growth rate in future periods) 1D , the dividend tax rate 
d , 






















While this model is based on the assumption of market efficiency, it does not account for 
behavioural aspects like the degree of tax awareness. Gamage and Shanske (2011) define the 
concept of tax awareness as “(…) any systematic differences between how taxpayers would 
perceive the costs of taxation in a hypothetical world of perfect economic rationality 
consistent with neoclassical economics and how taxpayers actually perceive the costs of 
taxation in the real world.” Reasons for tax unawareness are informational transaction costs, 
the complexity and changeability of tax regulations and the bounded rationality of private 
investors. Empirical findings show that drawing the attention of individuals to a certain tax 
increases their tax awareness, hence their responsiveness to this tax (Chetty, Looney, and 
Kroft, 2009; Finkelstein, 2009). Amending the model by taw awareness variables c  and d  
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In this model, c  and d  can take values between zero (investor is tax-unaware) and one 
(investor is fully tax-aware). Following Lang and Shackelford (2000), the marginal effect of 
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In general, free cash flows F  are higher than dividends D1, and shareholders realize positive 
capital gains. Thus, the derivative (3) is negative, and higher expected capital gains taxes 
reduce the share price. However, that holds only for tax-aware investors. If c  approaches 
zero, we generally obtain 
                                                          
5  Note that the simplifying assumption of constant payments, constant interest rates and constant tax rates can 
be justified by imperfect foresight of the market participants taking current values as expectations for future 
values. Similar implications of the modelling would follow if free cash flows were assumed to grow over 













Hence, investors who entirely lack tax awareness will expectedly not react to capital gains 
taxation. Note that c  of an individual investor may change suddenly over time. For example, 
a private investor who has heard about an upcoming tax reform without knowing any detail, 
would be informed by relatives, friends or his tax accountant and would be strongly advised 
to care about these issues immediately. 
Similar to Dai et al. (2008), our argument may be extended to a market equilibrium 
framework. We focus on demand-sided capitalization effects as lock-in effects are not 
relevant in our empirical setting.
6
 Therefore, we take the reservation price of the sellers as 
fixed and conclude that the supply curve will not be affected by the German capital gains tax 
reform 2009. 
By contrast, interpreting formula (2) as a representation of the equilibrium price from a buyer 
perspective, it turns out quite clearly that higher capital gains taxation will shift the demand 
curve and reduce average demand. However, this well-known effect of capital gains taxation 
will be mediated in our model by the average level of tax awareness in the market. If the 
number of tax-aware investors is high, capital gains taxes will be capitalized in the 
equilibrium price as described by Shackelford and Verrechia (2002) and Dai et al. (2008).  
However, if most market participants are tax-unaware, information on capital gains taxation 
would be initially ignored implying a small impact on the demand curve as well as on trading 
volumes and equilibrium prices. In such a setting, financial markets might show a delayed 
reaction on tax reforms resulting from a steadily dissemination of tax information.
7
 In case of 
a strong increase in tax awareness, there might also be an immediate market reaction resulting 
in significant effects on trading behavior.  
An important implication of our argument is that tax-aware investors may use their superior 
information to increase their trading profits. This can be exemplified by two private investors 
A and B with different tax awareness levels ( 1 0 c cA B;  ) in view of an upcoming increase 
in the capital gains tax rate. We assume further that B will adjust his or her awareness to 1 
                                                          
6  The lock-in effect is valid if the seller will demand for a higher selling price in order to compensate for 
unexpectedly high capital gains taxes. However, in our setting capital gains taxes were only increased for 
shares purchased by private investors after January 1, 2009. Therefore, sellers of shares in the relevant period 
(December 2008) were not affected by unexpectedly high capital gains taxes. 
7  This argument fits well with empirical evidence provided by Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh (2009) for delayed 
market reactions to earnings news. 
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after the increase of the tax rate (at the latest when capital gains are realized and capital gains 
taxes will have to be paid). As information on the tax law change becomes available, the 
reservation price of A AP  decreases, while BP  remains constant. Thus, A could sell shares to 
B obtaining for the price BP , while B would realize the loss resulting from the higher capital 
gains tax in future. 
Regarding the German capital gains tax reform 2009, we have good reason to believe that the 
majority of the affected private investors (institutional investors were unaffected) was far 
from being fully tax-aware. This is underlined by Deutsche Bank (2008) as well as by market 
research of the GfK for the Dresdner Bank and JP Morgan Asset Management (GfK, 2008; 
Hilmes, 2008). In addition, there are two arguments for a strong increase in average 
awareness regarding the capital gains tax reform 2009 in late December 2008. 
First of all, as mentioned before in Section 1 and Section 2, there was a vivid public discourse 
on the capital gains tax reform 2009 in December 2008 in major online portals (e.g. 
www.dasinvestment.com, Börse Online, Taz online, Manager Magazin Online) and daily 
newspapers (e.g. Berliner Morgenpost, Die Welt, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
Frankfurter Rundschau, Handelsblatt) increasing the awareness of the German public 
regarding that issue.  
Second, as documented by economic and psychological research, individuals tend to 
procrastinate actions (Akerlof, 1991; Hammer and Ferrari, 2002), which is especially an issue 
for savings behavior (see Thaler and Bernartzi, 2004; Carroll et al., 2009, with further 
references). Ferrari and Dovidio (2000) find evidence that “(…) people higher in decisional 
procrastination are systematic and strategic but search for more information specifically about 
chosen alternatives.” This fits well with our story as the acquisition of shares is a risky task 
and media discussion in December 2008 provided more information on the capital gains tax 
reform 2009. In addition, experiments from Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002) suggest that self-
imposed deadlines of individuals are not as effective as externally-imposed deadlines to 
overcome procrastination. Hence, the introduction date of the reform (as the final deadline) 
provided a strong incentive for procrastinators and initially unaware investors. 
Regarding the German capital gains tax reform 2009, a rational strategy in order to avoid 
capital gains taxes was the acquisition of shares before January 1, 2009. Note that shares 
acquired before that date were not affected by the flat tax on capital gains (even in future 
periods). While market reactions of well-informed rational taxpayers should have been 
focused on the announcement dates of the reform (see also Voeller and Müller, 2011), we 
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further expect a delayed market reaction close to the introduction date resulting from a lack of 
tax awareness and procrastination of investment behavior. Hence, we hypothesize: 
HYPOTHESIS 1a:  Trading volumes were abnormally high in the time closely before the 
introduction of the German capital gains tax reform 2009. 
An increased demand for shares implies higher asset prices if it is not related to a 
corresponding increase in share supply. In addition, the capital gains tax reform 2009 should 
also have increased the willingness to pay for “tax-free” shares if these shares were compared 
to taxable shares bought in 2009. Therefore, we expect an abnormal increase in asset prices by 
the end of 2008 as well. 
HYPOTHESIS 1b: Daily returns were abnormally high in the time closely before the 
introduction of the German capital gains tax reform 2009. 
HYPOTHESIS 1c:  Asset prices were abnormally high in the time closely before the 
introduction of the German capital gains tax reform 2009. 
While the introduction of capital gains taxes in Germany resulted in a short-run increase in the 
demand for shares by the end of 2008, we expect a reversal effect at the beginning of 2009. 
The main argument for this hypothesis is a demand-sided bring-forward effect. As the capital 
gains tax reform increased the relative attractiveness of shares bought in 2008, we expect a 
shifting of trades from 2008 to 2009. In addition, the introduction of the capital gains taxes 
rather reduced the attractiveness of share trades by 2009. Therefore, we conclude: 
HYPOTHESIS 2a:  Trading volumes were abnormally low in the time closely after the 
introduction of the German capital gains tax reform 2009. 
After the introduction of the new capital gains tax in January, 2009, economic theory implies 
a decreasing demand for shares as well as a decreasing willingness of private investors to pay 
for shares. Therefore, we expect abnormally low returns up to the point that stock prices 
reached their regular ‘normal’ level. This consideration suggests abnormally high asset prices 
and significantly negative abnormal returns in the period shortly after the introduction date of 
the capital gains tax reform 2009. 
HYPOTHESIS 2b:  Daily returns were abnormally low in the time closely after the 
introduction of the German capital gains tax reform 2009. 
HYPOTHESIS 2c:  Asset prices were abnormally high in the time closely after the 
introduction of the German capital gains tax reform 2009. 
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While media reports on capital gains taxation in December 2008 increased average tax 
awareness by German private investors, an additional incentive for procrastination resulted 
from Christmas celebrations 2008 including preparation activities like the invitation of friends 
and family members or the purchase of presents. In Germany, Christmas is celebrated from 
December 24 to December 26. On these days as well as on weekends and the New Year’s 
Eve, the German financial market is closed. In the year 2008, December 24 was a Wednesday. 
As a result, there were only two trading days left between Christmas 2008 and New Year’s 
Eve (December 29 and December 30). As result, we expect that market reactions resulting 
from the capital gains tax reform 2009 were especially strong on these two days. 
HYPOTHESIS 3a:  Trading volumes were especially high in the two days before the 
introduction of the German capital gains tax reform 2009. 
HYPOTHESIS 3b: Daily returns were especially high in the two days before the introduction 
of the German capital gains tax reform 2009. 
HYPOTHESIS 3c:  Asset prices were especially high in the two days before the introduction 
of the German capital gains tax reform 2009. 
 
4. Identification strategy and data 
4.1. Identification strategy 
A major strategy of the existing literature to identify pricing effects of capital gains taxes 
relies on a hypothesized differential impact of capital gains taxes on dividend-paying firms 
and non-dividend paying firms (Amoako-Adu, Rashid, and Stebbins, 1992; Lang and 
Shackelford, 2000; Dai, Maydew, Shackelford, and Zhang, 2008). This approach is based on 
the fact that returns from non-dividend-paying firms are exclusively based on capital gains, 
while returns from dividend-paying firms also result from dividends. Therefore, if investors 
capitalize taxes in a rational way, capital gains taxes will have a stronger impact on non-
dividend-paying firms compared to dividend-paying firms. 
An important assumption of this approach is that assets are priced rationally by investors 
being well-informed about all relevant tax issues. For that reason, this identification strategy 
does not seem to be feasible for our analysis of “tax-unaware” German investors, because 
these investors will typically not only be unaware of capital gains taxes as such but also of 
their differential effects on the returns of dividend-paying and non-dividend-paying firms. 
Taking into account the complexity of the correlation between asset prices, capital gains taxes 
13 
and dividends, this argument holds even in case of a temporary increase of tax awareness by 
the end of 2008.
8
 
As a result, we use an alternative identification strategy relying on comparisons between 
treated assets and non-treated assets. We interpret the introduction of a flat tax on private 
capital gains in Germany in January 2009 as a natural experiment, which can be analyzed by 
difference-in-differences estimation. Considering the well-known home bias of private 
investors (French and Poterba, 1991; Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock, 2004; Van 
Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 2009), we expect that tax changes in Germany will have a 
stronger impact on assets of the German stock market compared to assets of other major 
European stock markets. Jochem and Volz (2011) show that German investors hold slightly 
more than 50 % of their total shares on the German stock market. In case of private investors 
this share should be even higher. Thus, trading activities due to the capital gains tax reform 
2009 should have the greatest impact on the German stock market. For that reason, asset 
prices from other major European stock markets can be considered as an appropriate control 
group for shares traded on the German stock market. 
A potential problem of such an approach might be that the end-of-the-year effect (Starks, 
Yong, and Zheng, 2006) of the German stock market is structurally different from other 
European stock markets. To control for structural differences in the end-of-the-year effects 
between the German stock market (treatment group) and other major European stock markets 
(control group), we do not only consider observations from the turn-of-the-year 2008/2009, 
but also observations of preceding and following years. In detail, we consider observations of 
asset prices and trading volumes of 30 trading days before and 30 trading days after the-turn-
of-the-year 2008/2009 (treatment period) as well as corresponding trading data for the years 
2007/2008 and 2009/2010 (control period).  
Using control groups as well as control periods, our estimation strategy may also be denoted 
as difference-in-differences-in-differences estimation. This approach has a number of 
advantages. By considering control groups from other European countries, we are able to 
account for general market trends varying over time. By including control periods, we control 
for Germany-specific effects that do not vary significantly over time. In addition, we include a 
comprehensive set of control variables, namely stock fixed effects, stock market-year fixed 
                                                          
8  A careful analysis of the German practitioner literature of that period does not reveal any evidence that 
private investors were advised to buy “non-dividend-paying firms” to react on the capital gains tax reform 
2009. 
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effects, industry-year fixed effects and major structural variables (EBITDA, market value, 
book value). 
Taking into account that the German stock exchange
9
 is one of the biggest stock exchanges in 
Europe, we select Western European major stock exchanges as control group, namely United 
Kingdom (London Stock Exchange) and France (Paris Stock exchange as part of NYSE 
Euronext). This can be justified by the following aspects. 1) London Stock Exchange and 
Paris Stock Exchange are geographically close to the German trade center Frankfurt. 2) 
France and the United Kingdom are culturally and politically closely related to Germany, e.g. 
they are member states of the European Union. 3) United Kingdom, France and Germany are 
similar countries in terms of population size, geographic area, economic development and 
growth. 4) London Stock Exchange can be interpreted as a leading trading place affecting 
strongly other European stock markets. 5) There were no major tax reforms implemented in 
the United Kingdom or France during the treatment or control period which could bias our 
results.  
4.2. Data 
As data base, we rely on stock market and financial statement information using the 
DATASTREAM database. While information on asset prices and trading volumes for each 
stock is available for each trading day, financial statement data is based on business annual 
reports. As we use data of 60 trading days for each period, stock and stock market, we are 
provided with 261,900 stock-day observations.
10
 We consider information on all officially 
listed companies in Germany, France and the UK. 
This raw data has been adjusted in two ways. First of all, we exclude all observations with 
missing information on asset prices, trading volumes or control variables. Second, we do not 
consider observations with negative earnings before interests, taxes, depreciations and 
amortizations (EBITDA)
11
 or a negative price-to-book value (PTBV). Therefore, our final 
data is an unbalanced panel with 179,587 stock-day observations from five years: 52,317 
observations from the German stock exchange, 68,473 observations of the Paris Euronext 
stock exchange and 58,797 observations of the London stock exchange. 
                                                          
9  The main stock exchange in Germany is Frankfurt stock exchange. However, we also consider data from 
firms listed at other German stock exchanges like Munich or Stuttgart. 
10  While stock markets in Germany are closed on Christmas and the New Year’s Eve, trading on these days is 
typically possible in France and the UK. To align our data, we do not consider these trading days from 
France and the UK. Note that this effect is not only relevant for the year 2008/2009, but also for the 
preceding and the following observation periods. Thus, it should not bias our regression results. 
11  We exclude these observations as a logarithmic specification is not possible for a negative EBITDA. 
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Descriptive statistics on our major variables of interest (asset price, daily return, trading 
volume) and our most relevant control variables (market value, book value, EBITDA) are 
provided by Table 2. The daily return is measured as the relative change of the actual asset 
price compared to the last years’ asset price in percentage points. The trading volume is the 
number of trades of a given share per day. The book value has been calculated as the asset 
price divided by the price-to-book-ratio und multiplied with the number of shares. EBITDA 
are the current year earnings before interests, taxes, depreciations and amortizations. Asset 
price, market value, book value and EBITDA are reported in local currency (€ in Germany 
and France and British pounds in the UK).  
[Table 2 about here] 
Table 2 reveals that the average stock of the German market has a somewhat smaller market 
value and book value compared to France and the UK. In addition, average asset prices per 
stock are lower. The mean daily returns in all three stock markets are very small and 
statistically not different from zero. The average number of trades per day (trading volume) is 
higher in the UK and somewhat smaller in France, while average EBITDA is very similar in 
all three markets. In order to account for differences between stock markets, we consider 
stock fixed effects as well as stock market-year fixed effects in our regression analysis. 
5. Empirical results 
5.1. Graphical analysis 
For our graphical analysis, we derive estimates for abnormal asset prices, abnormal returns 
and abnormal trading volumes using the following regression model:  
it it it it i itY C u            (6) 
As dependent variables Yit, we use the logarithm of trading volume (measured by 1,000 trades 
per day), the logarithm of the asset price in local currency (€ or British pound) and the relative 
change of asset prices for each trading day (daily return). Regarding trading volume and asset 
price, we choose a logarithmic specification to obtain a relative measure for trading and 
pricing effects and to ensure the linearity in variables. 
Our vector of controls Cit accounts for the logarithm of market value, the logarithm of book 
value and the logarithm of EBITDA (all measured in millions of local currency). Regarding 
the market value, we do not account for changes within a given observation period (30 trading 
days before and after the end of a given year). Thus, we exclusively use the corresponding 
value of the first observation for each period. This is to avoid endogeneity, as the market 
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value might be driven by the asset price and not vice versa. We use realized EBITDA of the 
following period (e.g. EBITDA 2009 for the turn-of-the-year 2008/2009) as a proxy for the 
expected development of profits of listed companies. Table 3 provides descriptive statistics of 
our dependent and exogenous variables. 
[Table 3 about here] 
We also consider stock market-year fixed effects (set of dummy variables for each stock 
market-year combination) it  and industry-year fixed effects (set of dummy variables for each 
industry-year combination) it  to account for trends and exogenous shocks. In addition, we 
consider the panel nature of our data by including stock fixed effects i . In doing so, we also 
control for local currency effects. Therefore, our analysis is exclusively driven by variation in 
variables over time. In this model, abnormal daily returns, asset prices and trading volumes 
for each stock-day observation are measured by the regression residual itu . 
In Figure 2 to Figure 4, we report average residuals for the treatment group with the 
introduction of the capital gains tax (Germany) and the control group (France and UK) for the 
30 trading days before and after the end-of-year 2008/2009. All figures reveal that the 
regression residuals of the treatment group and the control group are closely correlated over 
the whole observation period. That holds especially for asset prices and daily returns. 
Therefore, our control group should provide us with an appropriate reference point to identify 
the impact of the German capital gains tax reform 2009. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
At the beginning of the observation period, abnormal trading volumes in Figure 2 are almost 
identical in the treatment group and the control group. However, we find a strong deviation of 
trading volumes beginning about one week before the turn-of-the-year 2008/2009. In this 
week there is an almost exponential increase in German abnormal trading volumes with a 
maximum difference compared to France and the UK by the last trading day in 2008. 
Thereafter, we find a strong decline in German abnormal trading volumes. Furthermore, 
abnormal trading volumes are constantly higher in the control group in 2009. Overall, our 
evidence fits well with the interpretation that German investors increased their trades by the 
end of 2008 and have shifted trades from 2009 to 2008 in order to avoid the German capital 
gains tax. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
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Regarding abnormal daily returns (Figure 3), we do not find significant deviations between 
treatment group and control group apart from the week before and the week after the 
introduction of the German flat tax on capital gains. In line with our expectations, abnormal 
returns of the treatment group are higher before and lower after the introduction of the capital 
gains tax. Therefore, the introduction of the German capital gains should have resulted in a 
temporary increase in the demand for shares as well as in a temporary increase in asset prices. 
This interpretation is confirmed by our evidence on abnormal asset prices surrounding the 
turn-of-the-year 2008/2009.  
[Figure 4 about here] 
As shown by Figure 4, abnormal asset prices in the treatment groups are almost identical to 
the control group apart from about one week before and one week after the turn-of-the-year 
2008/2009. All-in-all our graphical analysis clearly confirms our theoretical considerations 
and hypotheses. 
5.2. Regression analysis 
As reported by subsection 4.1., we interpret stock-day observations of the German stock 
market at the end-of-the-year 2008/2009 as treatment group and corresponding observations 
in France and the UK as control group to identify the impact of the German capital gains tax 
reform on trading volumes, asset prices and daily returns by difference-in-differences 
estimation. In addition, we use observations in corresponding reference periods in 2006/2007, 
2007/2008, 2009/2010 and 2010/2011 to control for structural differences in stock markets 
and end-of-the-year effects. Furthermore, we account for the same control variables as in our 
graphical analysis in section 5.1. This results in the following regression model with the 
dependent variables Yit logarithm of trading volume, logarithm of asset price and daily return 
in percentage points: 
1 2 3 4




it it it i it
Y Before Before Germany Before Before DiD
After After Germany After After DiD
C u
    
   
   
        
       
     
 (7) 
In this model, Before is a dummy variable with a value of one in a certain time window before 
the turn-of-the-year (otherwise zero). In line with our graphical evidence, we choose one 
week as standard reference period. This implies that the main effect of the German capital 
gains tax on trading volumes and asset prices can be observed one week (five trading days) 
before its introduction by the turn-of-the-year 2008/2009. However, we also test alternative 
reference periods (two days corresponding to our hypotheses 3a to 3c and two weeks). 
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Before Germany and Before 0809 are time dummies controlling for structural differences of 
end-of-the-year-effects in the German stock exchange or in the year 2008/2009. They are 
calculated as an interaction term of Before and a dummy variable for Germany (respectively 
for the year 2008/2009). The effect of the German capital gains tax reform is captured by 
Before DiD, which is an interaction term of Before, a dummy variable for Germany and the 
year dummy for 2008/2009. In line with our hypotheses, we expect that Before DiD is 
positively correlated to asset prices, daily returns and trading volumes. 
Similar to Before, After is a dummy variable with a value of one in a certain reference period 
after the turn of a given year. After Germany, After 0809 and After DiD are calculated in the 
same way as the corresponding interaction terms of our Before dummy. Corresponding to our 
hypotheses, we expect a positive correlation of After DiD with the asset price and a negative 
correlation of After DiD with daily returns and trading volumes.  
The control variables conform to our regression model (6). We estimate a simplified model 
including a limited set of controls (stock market-year fixed effects and stock fixed effects) and 
an extended model further including industry-year fixed effects as well as Market value, Book 
value and EBITDA (all measured by the logarithm of the corresponding values in millions of 
local currency). The estimation has been executed by OLS. We use robust standard errors 
being clustered for each share to account for heteroscedasticity and the correlation of standard 
errors over time. 
The regression results for the standard reference period of one week (five trading days) are 
reported by Table 4. In the models for daily returns, the regression coefficients of the dummy 
can be interpreted as a change in the daily return in percentage points. In the logarithmic 
models for asset prices or trading volumes, our results are to be interpreted as semi-
elasticities. Note that in this case the estimated dummy variable coefficients have to be 
recalculated in order to obtain the relative effect on the dependent variable. As shown by 
Kennedy (1981), the relative change can be approximated by   ˆ ˆ1exp 12  i iβ Var β , with the 
estimated regression coefficient ˆ
i  and the variance  ˆiVar  .  
[Table 4 about here]  
The regression results for our primary variables of interest (Before DiD and After DiD) 
confirm our theoretical expectations. For our interpretation we focus on the extended models 
with a higher number of control variables. Confirming Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 2a, the 
average daily trading volume of the German stock market in 2008/2009 was unexectedly 
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about 122 % higher before the introduction of the tax (Before DiD) and about 11 % lower 
thereafter (After DiD). Hence, trading volume seems to have been shifted up-front from 
January 2009 to December 2008. Regarding asset price, we find an about 3.2 % to 3.3 % 
higher price level one week before and one week after the introduction date, which confirms 
the hypotheses 1b and 2b. In line with the hypotheses 1c and 2c, we find on average an about 
2.1 percentage points higher (1.3 percentage points lower) abnormal daily return before (after) 
the introduction of the tax. Addressing the hypotheses 3a to 3c, we estimate regressions with 
an alternative reference period of two trading days before and after the turn-of-the-year. The 
results are reported by Table 5. 
[Table 5 about here] 
The results confirm our expectations. For the extended models with the higher number of 
control variables, we find an about 6.3 % higher average price level before the introduction 
date and a still 4.7 % higher price level thereafter. The abnormal daily return is 2.1 percentage 
points before the turn-of-the-year 2008/2009 and minus 1.7 percentage points after the tax 
reform. The trading volume in the two last German trading days in 2008 was about 151 % 
higher than the “normal” volume (Before DiD). However and contrasting our expectations, 
we do not find a significant decrease in the trading volume in the two days after the 
introduction date. Thus, the pull-forward effect of the capital gains tax rather affected trades 
at the end of the first trading week 2009. 
While Table 5 shows an especially strong increase of the price level and the trading volume 
within the last days in 2008, it cannot be taken as evidence that corresponding estimates are 
statistically different from the estimates in Table 4. Therefore, we re-estimate the model 
including all variables from both regressions. Results are provided by Table 6. 
 [Table 6 about here] 
As documented by our results on Before DiD and After DiD for two days (2D) as well as 
Before DiD and After DiD for one trading week (1W), we find evidence that higher trading 
volumes and price levels were especially focused on the last trading days between Christmas 
and New Year’s Eve 2008. However, we do not find a significant difference for daily returns. 
For the two days after the turn-of-the-year 2008/2009 we obtain higher abnormal asset prices 
and lower daily returns. By contrast, combining our estimates for After DiD (2D) and After 
DiD (1W), there is only a significantly lower trading volume in the last three trading days of 
the first trading week in January 2009. Thus, trading volume seems to have needed some time 
to drop from an abnormally high level to an abnormally low level. 
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The results of Table 6 clearly confirm our expectations and hypotheses. They also provide us 
with a more detailed estimate on market reactions due to the capital gains tax reform 
2008/2009. Combining the estimates on all relevant variables and focusing on the models 
with a higher number of controls, the abnormal increase in asset prices (trading volumes) was 
2.0 % (104 %) in the first three days of the last week 2008 and 7.4 % (160 %) in the last two 
trading days in 2008. The maximum increase in the price level can be calculated by the 
abnormal daily returns of about 2 percentage points in the last week. Therefore, prices 
increased on average by 10.3 % during the last week.  
5.3. Cross checks 
We calculated a number of cross checks to control for the robustness of our regression results. 
First of all, we controlled for alternative identification periods of market reactions (e.g. two 
weeks). In line with our graphical evidence, we did not find strong market reactions for the 
second last week of the year. Second, we increased the length of our observation period 
(identification period plus control period) for our investigation to 60 trading days before and 
after the turn-of-each year 2008/2009 (altogether 120 trading days). Corresponding results do 
not differ significantly from our basic analysis. Third, we increased the number of control 
periods from two (2007/2008 and 2009/2010) to four (2006/2007, 2007/2008, 2009/2010, 
2010/2011) in order to find out if our results are driven by events of our reference periods. 
Again, results correspond to our basic analysis.  
Fourth, we made additional regressions including observations with negative EBITDA. The 
consideration of these observations does not affect our estimates. Fifth, we amended our data 
by additional observations from the Spanish stock market (Madrid stock exchange) to account 
for the robustness of our control group. Corresponding results are in line with our main 
approach. Furthermore, we also made regressions considering only one major European 
capital market as control group (either Paris Euronext Stock Exchange or London Stock 
Exchange or Madrid Stock Exchange). These regressions do also confirm our basic analysis. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we address the question, if and how tax awareness and procrastination behavior 
may affect the impact of capital gains taxation on trading volumes and asset prices. We 
extend existing theoretical research on asset pricing by evidence on tax awareness and 
procrastination and hypothesize that not only the announcement date of a new tax will affect 
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trading volume and asset pricing, but also its introduction date if this is related to tax 
awareness. 
To address these issues empirically, we analyze the German introduction of a general flat tax 
of 26.38 % on capital gains of private investors in January 2009. Our research suggests that an 
increased level of tax awareness – driven by media reports on the introduction of the flat 
capital gains tax in 2009 – and procrastination behavior resulted in a strong increase in asset 
prices and trading volumes by the introduction date of the new tax. Therefore, investors seem 
to have paid an average surcharge of about 7.4 % during the last trading days of 2008, while 
prices increased unexpectedly by about 10.3 % during the last week. In line with our 
interpretation, we find that abnormal daily returns and trading volumes were significantly 
higher before the introduction date of the new German capital gains tax and significantly 
lower thereafter. This short-term effect was more pronounced for time periods close to the 
introduction date of the tax and vanished in the long run.  
Taking into account the existing literature on asset pricing, our research has a number of 
interesting implications. First of all, we argue and find evidence that tax policies not 
necessarily affect all types of investors. Thus, if investors only have a limited tax knowledge 
and high transaction costs to gain more detailed information, their reaction on tax policies 
might be limited or delayed. As a result, policy makers might use information policy to affect 
investor behavior and to reduce undesirable tax effects.  
Second, our findings provide evidence that stock markets are not necessarily efficient in 
processing tax information. If there is a relevant number of investors being unaware about a 
certain event (e.g. the German capital gains tax reform 2009), this information might be 
ignored for a considerable period up to a moment where investor awareness increases. Thus, 
an important implication of our paper is the relevance of investor awareness and 
procrastination effects, which might result in herd behavior and higher market volatility in 
case of a strong increase of public awareness.   
Third, our findings can be interpreted as evidence for potential tax arbitrage strategies of 
banks, insurances and other well-informed investor types. As suggested by our regression 
results, investors paid an average price surcharge of about 7.4 % during the two days before 
the introduction date of the capital gains tax reform 2009. Therefore, anticipating such market 
reactions, it would have been a good strategy for well-informed investors to buy shares, sell 
them shortly before the introduction date and to rebuy them again after the turn-of-the-year 
2008/2009. Note that the German capital gains tax reform 2009 was only relevant for private 
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investors and not for institutional investors like corporations. Thereby, higher capital gains 
taxes on shares bought in 2009 were only a burden for private investors, but not for 
institutional investors. From this perspective, the capital gains tax reform 2009 should have 
been a welcome possibility of well-informed investors to generate higher trading profits. 
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TABLE 1: German capital gains tax reform 2009 
  
 acquisition before  
2009-01-01 
 acquisition after  
2009-01-01 
holding period  < 1 year   > 1 year   no relevance  
percentage of capital gain 
taxable 
50 % 0 % 100 % 
taxation 
 
 tax exempt 
  




 13.19 % 
 18.46 % 




 26.38 %  
 26.38 %  
 26.38 %  
i  progressive personal income tax rate varying from 0 % to 45 % 
c  general capital gains tax rate, 25 %  
s  solidarity tax surcharge rate, 5.5 % 
Our analysis is based on the following assumptions: The taxpayer is resident in Germany and liable to unlimited 
taxation in Germany, shares are qualified as private assets, the participation quota never exceeded 1 % over the 
last 5 years, no consideration of individual tax-free amounts. 
 0 5 1i s.      1c s  
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TABLE 2: Descriptive statistics 
 German stock exchange French stock exchange UK Stock exchange  
Observations 52,317 68,473 58,797  
Variable Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
Asset price 30.60 12.03 79.50 51.51 19.96 230.80 455.97 274.00 631.48 
Daily return (%) 0.02 0.00 3.81 -.17 0.00 3.20 -0.03 0.00 3.56 
Trading volume (1,000) 728.57 23.2 3,833.42 506.26 5.70 2,027.76 4,156.08 749.00 16,368.07 
Market value (in Mio.) 3,029.20 187.22 9,661.94 3,401.27 196.42 11,419.44 3,972.31 607.72 11,873.39 
Book value (in Mio.) 1,903.92 145.01 5,967.06 2,325.84 179.35 7,503.35 2,279.56 291.90 8,170.69 
EBITDA (in Mio.) 815.19 44.86 2,742.28 712.77 45.06 2,452.99 806.04 97.35 2,704.57 
Asset prices, market values, book values and EBITDA are reported in local currency (€ or British pounds). Trading volume is 
reported in share trades per day. Daily return is the relative change in share prices compared to the asset price of the 
preceding year.  
 
TABLE 3: Descriptive statistics of regression variables 
 German stock exchange French stock exchange UK Stock exchange  
Observations 52,317 68,473 58,797  
Variable Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
Asset price (LN) 2.4592 2.4870 1.3519 3.0133 3.1271 1.3404 5.7035 5.7430 1.0902 
Daily return (%) 0.0176 0.0000 3.8084 -0.1670 0.0000 3.2016 -0.0292 0.0000 3.5633 
Trading volume (LN) 3.3716 3.148 2.7207 2.2542 1.8245 3.1564 6.2791 6.6020 2.3962 
Market value (LN) 5.6577 5.3178 2.2004 5.7886 5.4885 2.2243 6.7718 6.6022 1.6361 
Book value (LN) 5.1720 4.9202 2.1071 5.4236 5.2105 2.1658 5.9806 5.7281 1.7239 
EBITDA (LN) 4.0460 3.7856 2.3797 4.0342 3.8762 2.4108 4.8746 4.6540 1.7377 


























TABLE 4: Regression results (one trading week) 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Dependent variable Asset price Asset price Daily return Daily return Volume Volume 
Before (1W) 0.0148*** 0.0146*** 0.00593*** 0.00593*** -0.361*** -0.361*** 
 (0.00157) (0.00146) (0.000294) (0.000294) (0.0181) (0.0181) 
Before Germany (1W) 0.0128*** 0.0138*** -0.00209*** -0.00210*** 0.0368 0.0371 
 (0.00311) (0.00283) (0.000558) (0.000558) (0.0302) (0.0302) 
Before 0809 (1W) -0.0250*** -0.0250*** -0.00357*** -0.00357*** 0.173*** 0.173*** 
 (0.00447) (0.00436) (0.000696) (0.000696) (0.0263) (0.0263) 
Before DiD (1W) 0.0418*** 0.0324*** 0.0210*** 0.0210*** 0.802*** 0.800*** 
 (0.00810) (0.00744) (0.00179) (0.00180) (0.0457) (0.0457) 
After (1W) 0.0270*** 0.0269*** 0.00158*** 0.00158*** -0.106*** -0.105*** 
 (0.00148) (0.00138) (0.000315) (0.000315) (0.0141) (0.0141) 
After Germany (1W) 0.0126*** 0.0118*** 0.00142** 0.00142** -0.0512** -0.0513** 
 (0.00331) (0.00294) (0.000634) (0.000635) (0.0247) (0.0247) 
After 0809 (1W) 0.0256*** 0.0258*** 0.0112*** 0.0112*** -0.0162 -0.0163 
 (0.00401) (0.00408) (0.000849) (0.000848) (0.0278) (0.0278) 
After DiD (1W) 0.0293*** 0.0319*** -0.0125*** -0.0125*** -0.114** -0.113** 
 (0.00800) (0.00794) (0.00165) (0.00165) (0.0462) (0.0462) 
EBITDA  0.0477***  0.000632***  0.0245 
  (0.0103)  (0.000196)  (0.0251) 
Market value  0.724***  -0.00380***  0.210*** 
  (0.0298)  (0.000408)  (0.0544) 
Book value  0.141***  0.000886**  -0.0546 
  (0.0305)  (0.000372)  (0.0594) 
Constant 3.904*** -1.604*** -0.00302*** 0.0127*** 4.216*** 2.661*** 
 (0.00847) (0.224) (8.49e-05) (0.00308) (0.0126) (0.462) 
Stock fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Market-year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry-year fixed effects NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Number of observations 179,587 179,587 179,587 179,587 179,587 179,587 
Number of assets/firms 1,266 1,266 1,266 1,266 1,266 1,266 
Within R2 0.490 0.728 0.00802 0.00865 0.0590 0.0616 
Overall R2 0.0435 0.398 0.00808 0.00217 0.00639 0.411 
Dependent variables: logarithm of asset price, daily return (in percentage points) and logarithm of trading volume (in 
thousands). Estimates are calculated by OLS with stock fixed effects. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are 
clustered on the asset level and documented in parentheses; *** / ** / * indicate statistical significance on the 1 % / 5 % / 
10 % level.  
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TABLE 5: Regression results (two trading days) 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Dependent variable Asset price Asset price Daily return Daily return Volume Volume 
Before (2D) 0.0188*** 0.0189*** 0.00640*** 0.00640*** -0.744*** -0.744*** 
 (0.00161) (0.00145) (0.000407) (0.000406) (0.0231) (0.0231) 
Before Germany (2D) 0.00884** 0.00912*** -0.00274*** -0.00275*** 0.386*** 0.386*** 
 (0.00368) (0.00313) (0.000846) (0.000846) (0.0416) (0.0416) 
Before 0809 (2D) -0.0218*** -0.0220*** 0.00545*** 0.00545*** 0.123*** 0.123*** 
 (0.00440) (0.00422) (0.00122) (0.00122) (0.0352) (0.0351) 
Before DiD (2D) 0.0704*** 0.0610*** 0.0213*** 0.0214*** 0.924*** 0.921*** 
 (0.00887) (0.00791) (0.00245) (0.00245) (0.0582) (0.0583) 
After (2D) 0.0310*** 0.0312*** 0.00484*** 0.00484*** -0.225*** -0.225*** 
 (0.00149) (0.00136) (0.000475) (0.000475) (0.0183) (0.0183) 
After Germany (2D) 0.00768** 0.00603** 0.00185* 0.00185* 0.0112 0.0108 
 (0.00365) (0.00294) (0.00105) (0.00105) (0.0298) (0.0298) 
After 0809 (2D) 0.00605 0.00735* 0.0187*** 0.0187*** -0.169*** -0.168*** 
 (0.00412) (0.00415) (0.00137) (0.00137) (0.0343) (0.0343) 
After DiD (2D) 0.0480*** 0.0459*** -0.0174*** -0.0174*** -0.0376 -0.0386 
 (0.00861) (0.00817) (0.00261) (0.00261) (0.0587) (0.0588) 
EBITDA  0.0477***  0.000631***  0.0246 
  (0.0103)  (0.000194)  (0.0251) 
Market value  0.724***  -0.00378***  0.211*** 
  (0.0298)  (0.000407)  (0.0544) 
Book value  0.141***  0.000883**  -0.0545 
  (0.0305)  (0.000371)  (0.0593) 
Constant 3.907*** -1.601*** -0.00278*** 0.0129*** 4.205*** 2.646*** 
 (0.00847) (0.224) (8.20e-05) (0.00307) (0.0126) (0.462) 
Stock fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Market-year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry-year fixed effects NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Number of observations 179,587 179,587 179,587 179,587 179,587 179,587 
Number of assets/firms 1,266 1,266 1,266 1,266 1,266 1,266 
Within R2 0.490 0.727 0.00929 0.00991 0.0639 0.0665 
Overall R2 0.0439 0.399 0.00934 0.00275 0.00661 0.407 
Dependent variables: logarithm of asset price, daily return (in percentage points) and logarithm of trading volume (in 
thousands). Estimates are calculated by OLS with stock fixed effects. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are 
clustered on the asset level and documented in parentheses; *** / ** / * indicate statistical significance on the 1 % / 5 % / 
10 % level.  
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TABLE 6: Regression results (two trading days and one trading week) 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Dependent variable Asset price Asset price Daily return Daily return Volume Volume 
Before (2D) 0.0101*** 0.0105*** 0.00121** 0.00121** -0.669*** -0.669*** 
 (0.00100) (0.000915) (0.000593) (0.000592) (0.0244) (0.0244) 
Before Germany (2D) -0.00431 -0.00534** -0.00113 -0.00114 0.577*** 0.577*** 
 (0.00337) (0.00241) (0.00113) (0.00113) (0.0417) (0.0417) 
Before 0809 (2D) 0.00603** 0.00556** 0.0147*** 0.0147*** -0.0366 -0.0365 
 (0.00279) (0.00245) (0.00163) (0.00163) (0.0374) (0.0374) 
Before DiD (2D) 0.0518*** 0.0513*** 0.00210 0.00212 0.244*** 0.243*** 
 (0.00651) (0.00558) (0.00322) (0.00322) (0.0619) (0.0620) 
After (2D) 0.00967*** 0.0100*** 0.00582*** 0.00582*** -0.208*** -0.207*** 
 (0.00110) (0.000991) (0.000580) (0.000581) (0.0210) (0.0209) 
After Germany (2D) -0.00544* -0.00673*** 0.000771 0.000766 0.0758** 0.0753** 
 (0.00315) (0.00231) (0.00135) (0.00135) (0.0358) (0.0358) 
After 0809 (2D) -0.0314*** -0.0296*** 0.0122*** 0.0122*** -0.230*** -0.229*** 
 (0.00273) (0.00251) (0.00179) (0.00179) (0.0389) (0.0389) 
After DiD (2D) 0.0338*** 0.0255*** -0.00673** -0.00667** 0.181*** 0.178*** 
 (0.00743) (0.00620) (0.00335) (0.00334) (0.0682) (0.0683) 
Before (1W) 0.0105*** 0.0102*** 0.00542*** 0.00542*** -0.0808*** -0.0809*** 
 (0.00159) (0.00151) (0.000421) (0.000421) (0.0200) (0.0200) 
Before Germany (1W) 0.0148*** 0.0161*** -0.00161** -0.00162** -0.207*** -0.206*** 
 (0.00329) (0.00289) (0.000744) (0.000744) (0.0316) (0.0316) 
Before 0809 (1W) -0.0272*** -0.0270*** -0.00937*** -0.00937*** 0.173*** 0.173*** 
 (0.00465) (0.00451) (0.000946) (0.000946) (0.0292) (0.0292) 
Before DiD (1W) 0.0201** 0.0110 0.0199*** 0.0199*** 0.718*** 0.716*** 
 (0.00818) (0.00753) (0.00235) (0.00235) (0.0514) (0.0514) 
After (1W) 0.0231*** 0.0229*** -0.000752* -0.000750* -0.0225 -0.0225 
 (0.00156) (0.00146) (0.000384) (0.000384) (0.0165) (0.0165) 
After Germany (1W) 0.0148*** 0.0144*** 0.00107 0.00107 -0.0806*** -0.0806*** 
 (0.00352) (0.00315) (0.000810) (0.000811) (0.0301) (0.0301) 
After 0809 (1W) 0.0381*** 0.0376*** 0.00634*** 0.00634*** 0.0743** 0.0740** 
 (0.00407) (0.00409) (0.00112) (0.00112) (0.0327) (0.0327) 
After DiD (1W) 0.0158* 0.0217*** -0.0100*** -0.0101*** -0.182*** -0.180*** 
 (0.00854) (0.00832) (0.00212) (0.00212) (0.0550) (0.0551) 
EBITDA  0.0477***  0.000631***  0.0246 
  (0.0103)  (0.000196)  (0.0251) 
Market value  0.724***  -0.00380***  0.210*** 
  (0.0298)  (0.000407)  (0.0544) 
Book value  0.141***  0.000881**  -0.0545 
  (0.0305)  (0.000371)  (0.0593) 
Constant 3.904*** -1.604*** -0.00302*** 0.0127*** 4.215*** 2.661*** 
 (0.00847) (0.224) (8.49e-05) (0.00308) (0.0126) (0.462) 
Stock fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Market-year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry-year fixed effects NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Number of observations 179,587 179,587 179,587 179,587 179,587 179,587 
Number of stocks 1,266 1,266 1,266 1,266 1,266 1,266 
Within R2 0.491 0.728 0.0112 0.0119 0.0671 0.0697 
Overall R2 0.0435 0.398 0.0113 0.00364 0.00707 0.405 
Dependent variables: logarithm of asset price, daily return (in percentage points) and logarithm of trading volume (in 
thousands). Estimates are calculated by OLS with stock fixed effects. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are 
clustered on the asset level and documented in parentheses; *** / ** / * indicate statistical significance on the 1 % / 5 % / 
10 % level.  
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FIGURE 1: Timing of the business tax reform 2008/2009 
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